Author Archives: Net economy

5 Best Practices for Utilizing Open Source Software

Open source software is everywhere and has the potential to help businesses accelerate development and improve software quality. Achieving these results can be challenging if care is not taken.
By Jacob Beningo – Here are five best practices for utilizing open source software successfully.

Best Practice #1 – Use an abstraction layer to remove dependencies
One of the common issues with code bases I review is that developers tightly couple their application code with the software libraries they use. For example, if a developer is using FreeRTOS, their application code makes calls specific to the FreeRTOS APIs in such a way that if a developer ever decided to change their RTOS, they’d have to rewrite a lot of code to replace all those RTOS calls. You might decide that changing libraries is rare, but you’d be surprised how often teams start down a path with one OS, library or component only to have to go back and rewrite code when they decide they need to make a change.

The first thing teams should do when they select an open source component, and even commercial components, is to create an abstraction layer to interact with that component. Using RTOS as an example, a team would use an OS abstraction layer, OSAL, that would allow them to write their application code with OS independent APIs. If the OS changes, the application doesn’t care, because it’s accessing an abstraction layer and the software change can take minutes rather than days.

Best Practice #2 – Leverage integrated software when possible
Most open source software is written in its own sandbox without much thought given to other components with which it may need to interact. Components are often written with different coding standards, styles, degrees of testing, and so on. When you start to pull together multiple open source components that were not designed to work with each other, it can result in long debugging sessions, headaches, and missed deadlines. Whenever possible, select components that have already been integrated and tested together.

Best Practice #3 – Perform a software audit and quality analysis
There is a lot of great open source software and a lot of not so great software. Before a developer decides to use an open source component in their project, they need to make sure they take the time to perform their due diligence on the software or hire someone to do it for them. This involves taking the time to audit the component and perform a quality analysis. Quality is often in the eye of the beholder.

At a minimum, when starting out with an open source component, the source code should be reviewed for:

Complexity using cyclomatic complexity measurements
Functionally to ensure it meets the businesses needs and objectives
Adherence to best practices and coding standards (based on needs)
Ability to handle errors
Testability

Best Practice #4 – Have the license reviewed by an attorney
Open source software licensing can be difficult to navigate. There are a dozen or so different licensing schemes, which place different requirements on the user. In some cases, the developer can use the open source software as they see fit. In others, the software can be used but any other software must also be open sourced. This means that it may require releasing a product’s secret sauce, which could damage their competitive market advantage. more>

There’s a hidden economic trendline that is shattering the global trade system

By Marshall Auerback and Jan Ritch-Frel – Former U.S. Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers has recently conceded: “In general, economic thinking has privileged efficiency over resilience, and it has been insufficiently concerned with the big downsides of efficiency.” Policy across the globe is, therefore, moving in a more overtly nationalistic direction to rectify this shortcoming.

COVID-19 has accelerated a process that was well underway before it, spreading beyond U.S.-China-EU trade negotiations and into the world’s 50 largest economies. As much as many defenders of the old order lament this trend, it is as significant a shift as the dawn of the World Trade Organization global trade era.

Economists, politicians, and leading pundits are often tempted to see new economic patterns through the prisms of the past; we are therefore likely to hear that we’re back in an era of 19th-century mercantilism, or 1970s-style stagflation. But that misses the moment—the motives are different, and so are the outcomes.

What we are experiencing is the realisation by state planners of developed countries that new technologies enable a rapid ability to expand or initiate new and profitable production capacity closer to or inside their own markets. The cost savings in transport, packaging and security and benefits to regional neighbours and these countries’ domestic workforces will increasingly compete with the price of goods produced through the current internationalized trade system. U.S. national politicians from President Donald Trump to Senator Elizabeth Warren will be joined by a growing chorus who see the long-term domestic political benefit of supporting this transition.

The combination of high-speed communication, advances in automated manufacturing and computing combined with widespread access to the blueprints and information necessary to kick-start new production capacity increasingly makes the current international network of supply chains resemble a Rube Goldberg contraption, and it lightens the currency outflow challenge that many economies have had to deal with for the past seven decades.

Growing political will to restore manufacturing capacity in the national interest will have a shattering effect on countries that built up their economies through a labour price advantage over the past 40 years. No amount of currency depreciation or product dumping can overcome the reality of a country’s foreign customer base suddenly opting to produce and buy their own goods at competitive prices.

Taken in sum, the transformation underway isn’t just Donald Trump demanding less dependency on China’s production capacity—it’s a global process. It’s also India signalling it’s going to try to strike its own technological path away from China.

The rationales provided by governments to escape the strictures of the existing trade arrangements and into the new era are fairly easy: a mix of opportunism and need, tied to the exigencies of the moment, such as the current pandemic, and long-term national security, which of course can ultimately amount to any economic activity of scope. Senator Elizabeth Warren’s introduction in July of her sweeping Pharmaceutical Supply Chain Defense and Enhancement Act demonstrates that the U.S. power establishment is beginning to reach a consensus on this issue—no longer the sole province of Trump-era nationalism. “To defeat the current COVID-19 crisis and better equip the United States against future pandemics, we must boost our country’s manufacturing capacity,” Warren said, recasting the consequences of decades of policy to offshore our economic production as an “overreliance on foreign countries.” Likewise, Senator Tom Cotton has introduced a new bill focusing on domestic production of semiconductors, titled the “American Foundries Act of 2020,” which aims to rebuild the country’s semiconductor capacity. This bill too has significant bipartisan backing.

The government of Japan’s newly defined restrictions on foreign investment as reported by the Financial Times of around a dozen sectors including “power generation, military equipment, [computer] software [and technology]” in effect prioritize the claims of domestic manufacturers on national security grounds.

The government of Australia has likewise outlined new powers to scrutinize new overseas investment, as well as forcing foreign companies to sell their assets if they pose a national security threat. The proposals come in the wake of an intensifying trade war between the governments of Beijing and Canberra, alongside “a dramatic increase in the number of foreign investment bids probed by Australia’s spy agency ASIO, over fears that China was spying on sensitive health data,” according to news.com.au. This is happening at the same time that there has been an overhaul of thought with regard to manufacturing, something Australia hasn’t typically done much of. The headlines from Australia are beginning to look a lot like the Area Development stories in the United States.

The Canadian government has also announced plans to enhance foreign investment scrutiny “related to public health or critical supply chains during the pandemic, as well as any investment by state-owned companies or by investors with close ties to foreign governments,” according to the Globe and Mail. This attempt to disaggregate beneficial foreign investment flows from those deemed contrary to the national interest used to be a common feature of government policy in the post-World War II period. Canada established the Foreign Investment Review Agency in 1973 as a result of mounting concerns about rising overseas investment, notably the domination of U.S. multinationals, in the Canadian economy. Its provisions were repeatedly downgraded as globaliaation pressures intensified, but its value is now being reassessed for compatibility with national health policy and resiliency in manufacturing chains. Predictably, pharmaceutical independence is high on the list.

Taiwan, “a net importer of surgical masks before the pandemic, [has] created an onshore mask-manufacturing industry in just a month after registering its first infections in January,” reports the Financial Times. “Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen… said Taipei would repeat that approach to foster other new industries.” And world economists have noted that Taiwan and Vietnam lead the world in growth of global market share in exports, at the expense of larger economies like China.

In Europe, the EU leadership is publicly indicating a policy of subsidy and state investment in companies to prevent Chinese buyouts or “undercutting… prices.” This was supposed to represent a cross-European effort, but the coronavirus policy response is increasingly driven at the national level. Consequently, it is starting to fracture the EU’s single market, which has long been constructed on an intricate network of cross-border supply chains and strict rules preventing state subsidies to national champions.

Even Germany, with a vibrant export sector that has long made it a beneficiary of globalization, has also signaled a move toward greater economic nationalism.

Economic nationalist considerations are also driving a shift in Britain’s negotiating stance in the current Brexit trade negotiations with the EU, with the UK clearly prioritizing national sovereignty over frictionless free trade with its former single-market partners, even if that means a so-called “Hard Brexit.” The EU’s single-market rules specifically preclude state aid to specific industries if it undermines the operation of the single market. But the UK’s chief negotiating officer, David Frost, has made it clear that the ability to break free from the EU’s rulebook was essential to the purpose of Brexit, even if that meant reverting to the less favorable WTO trade relationship that exists for other non-EU countries.

Over the past 40 years, this kind of overt economic nationalism, especially as it has pertained to domestic manufacturing capabilities, has generally been eschewed by the United States, at least until the ascension of Donald Trump to the White House. In part, this is a product of the fact that as global hegemon, the United States used to be able to dominate global institutions (such as the International Monetary Fund and the WTO) and shape them toward U.S. national interests. But when necessary, national security considerations have intervened.

More recently, national security considerations in the semiconductor industry have again revived in the wake of the Trump administration’s growing dispute with Chinese 5G telecommunications equipment maker Huawei. The U.S. Commerce Department has now mandated that all semiconductor chip manufacturers using U.S. equipment, IP, or design software will require a license before shipping to Huawei. This decision has forced the world’s biggest chipmaker—Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC)—to stop taking fresh orders from Huawei, as it uses U.S. equipment in its own manufacturing processes. Paradoxically, then, the Trump administration has exploited pre-existing global supply linkages in the furtherance of a more robust form of economic nationalism. The same policy attitude is now visible with regard to pharmaceuticals (as it is in other parts of the world, to the likely detriment of China and India).

A shift like this will have a knock-on effect that will reverberate to the other parts of the world that for centuries have been forcibly limited—by arms and finance—to being sources of raw material export, refined if they were lucky. They will watch closely what happens with Australia, which for the majority of the past 150 years has been an exporter of food and minerals, but is now jumping on the project to establish a national manufacturing base.

As dozens of countries build their own manufacturing base—something only a handful of countries controlled for most of modern history—big questions will emerge about geopolitical stabilization and the classical tools of foreign influence. The world today in some respects resembles the 19th century’s balance-of-power politics, even as the majority of countries understand that some minimal level of state collaboration is essential to combat shared challenges. China is party to a growing number of global disputes, as emerging great powers typically experience: the U.S. vs. China, China vs. IndiaJapan vs. ChinaChina vs. Australia, and the EU vs. China. But hot wars are unlikely to feature as prominently as they did two centuries ago.

Expect to see Cold War-style conflict intensify, however, albeit in new forms. Instead of the old geopolitical arenas including access to vital commodities or stable petroleum markets, the new forms of the competition will put greater weight on access to advanced research and technologies, such as the collection, transfer and storage of data and the quantum computing power to process it.

The speed at which global supply chains can potentially shift to accommodate the rise in economic nationalism is considerable. The success with which we manage the transition will largely settle the debate as to whether it is, in fact, the better path to greater prosperity and global stability. more>

No more free-lunch bailouts

With governments spending on a massive scale to mitigate the economic fallout from Covid-19, they should be positioning their economies for a more sustainable future.
By Mariana Mazzucato and Andreo Andreoni – The Covid-19 crisis and recession provides a unique opportunity to rethink the role of the state, particularly its relationship with business. The long-held assumption that government is a burden on the market economy has been debunked. Rediscovering the state’s traditional role as an ‘investor of first resort’—rather than just as a lender of last resort—has become a precondition for effective policy-making in the post-Covid era.

Fortunately, public investment has picked up. While the United States has adopted a $3 trillion stimulus and rescue package, the European Union has introduced a €750 billion ($850 billion) recovery plan [albeit still under deliberation], and Japan has marshaled an additional $1 trillion in assistance for households and businesses.

However, in order for investment to lead to a healthier, more resilient and productive economy, money is not enough. Governments also must restore the capacity to design, implement and enforce conditionality on recipients, so that the private sector operates in a manner that is more conducive to inclusive, sustainable growth.

Government support for corporations takes many forms, including direct cash grants, tax breaks and loans issued on favorable terms or government guarantees—not to mention the expansive role played by central banks, which have purchased corporate bonds on a massive scale. This assistance should come with strings attached, such as requiring firms to adopt emissions-reduction targets and to treat their employees with dignity (in terms of both pay and workplace conditions). Thankfully, with even the business community rediscovering the merits of conditional assistance—through the pages of the Financial Times, for example —this form of state intervention is no longer taboo.

And there are some good examples. Both Denmark and France are denying state aid to any company domiciled in an EU-designated tax haven and barring large recipients from paying dividends or buying back their own shares until 2021. Similarly, in the US, the Massachusetts senator Elizabeth Warren has called for strict bailout conditions, including higher minimum wages, worker representation on corporate boards and enduring restrictions on dividends, stock buybacks and executive bonuses. And in the United Kingdom, the Bank of England has pressed for a temporary moratorium on dividends and buybacks. more>

Updates from McKinsey

Taking supplier collaboration to the next level
Closer relationships between buyers and suppliers could create significant value and help supply chains become more resilient. New research sheds light on the ingredients for success.
By Agustin Gutierrez, Ashish Kothari, Carolina Mazuera, and Tobias Schoenherr – Companies with advanced procurement functions know that there are limits to the value they can generate by focusing purely on the price of the products and services they buy. These organizations understand that when buyers and suppliers are willing and able to cooperate, they can often find ways to unlock significant new sources of value that benefit them both

Buyers and suppliers can work together to develop innovative new products, for example, boosting revenues and profits for both parties. They can take an integrated approach to supply-chain optimization, redesigning their processes together to reduce waste and redundant effort, or jointly purchasing raw materials. Or they can collaborate in forecasting, planning, and capacity management—thereby improving service levels, mitigating risks, and strengthening the combined supply chain.

Earlier work has shown that supplier collaboration really does move the needle for companies that do it well. In one McKinsey survey of more than 100 large organizations in multiple sectors, companies that regularly collaborated with suppliers demonstrated higher growth, lower operating costs, and greater profitability than their industry peers.

Despite the value at stake, however, the benefits of supplier collaboration have proved difficult to access. While many companies can point to individual examples of successful collaborations with suppliers, executives often tell us that they have struggled to integrate the approach into their overall procurement and supply-chain strategies.

Several factors make supplier collaboration challenging. Projects may require significant time and management effort before they generate value, leading companies to prioritize simpler, faster initiatives, even if they are worth less. Collaboration requires a change in mind-sets among buyers and suppliers, who may be used to more transactional or even adversarial relationships. And most collaborative efforts need intensive, cross-functional involvement from both sides, a marked change to the normal working methods at many companies. This change from a cost-based to a value-based way of thinking requires a paradigm shift that is often difficult to come by. more>

Related>

New US Semi Fab: Reality or Illusion?

Official talks on construction and operation of a new TSMC semiconductor chip manufacturing fab the in U.S. is promising but riddled with political and technical intrigue.
By John Blyler – Will the news of a new semiconductor fab on U.S. soil be a boost to the economy and technological stability or is it merely a fanciful political scheme? To answer that question, let’s start with the news that has created so much discussion in the electronics space.

Recently, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) announced its intention to build and operate an advanced 5nm semiconductor fab in the U.S. state of Arizona. TSMC, headquartered in Taiwan, is the largest chip manufacturer in the world. The company currently operates a fab in Camas, Washington and design centers in both Austin, Texas and San Jose, California. The Arizona facility would be TSMC’s second manufacturing site in the United States.

The new manufacturing plant would be supported with funds from Arizona and the U.S. government. The fab will have a 20,000 wafer-per-month capacity, create over 1,600 jobs directly and thousands more indirectly, explained the company in a press statement.

This by TSMC is welcomed in the U.S. but not without controversy. Shortly after the announcement of the new fab, the U.S. Department of Commerce announced new restrictions on TSMC’s second-largest customer, HiSilicon of China – which is fully owned by Huawei. Some industry experts feel that the two events are related to the issue of U.S. export control.

Here’s where the political side of the TSMC fab announcement begins to emerge. Huawei, already part of the US trade war with China, was recently placed under new and more stringent export control. On May 19, the Commerce Department issued new rules to more fully close off Huawei’s access to the semiconductor chips it needs to build cellphones and 5G infrastructure. This could conceivably block China’s big telecommunications company from entering the much desired global 5G mobile network space. more>

‘Shareholder value’ versus the public good: the case of Germany

Support for companies amid the pandemic must come with social and ecological strings attached.
By Emre Gömec and Mustafa Erdem Sakinç – With uncertainty around the world about how and when the coronavirus outbreak will decelerate, whole business sectors have been affected by lockdowns and are facing ruin. In Germany, more than 750,000 companies have put over 12 million employees on reduced working hours (Kurzarbeit), dwarfing the 3 million hit by the 2008 crisis.

Society’s loss goes beyond the toll on employment. As the crisis lengthens, innovative capabilities accumulated over years and even decades may atrophy and disappear, making it far more difficult to emerge from the pandemic with a healthy economy.

This ‘innovation drain’ can be avoided if, and only if, corporations devote every available resource to retaining, and reinvesting, in productive capacity. Implementation of the rescue packages adopted in Germany in March and June must thus fundamentally address future practices of corporate resource allocation.

Making government support conditional on replacing value-extractive practices, such as excessive dividend payments and executive compensation, is the most effective way to block damaging business decisions which undermine investment in productive capabilities and secure employment.

Germany’s case was, it’s true, not as dramatic as that of the US, where S&P 500 companies, having fallen victim to the American disease of corporate financialization, distributed 92 per cent of their net income between 2009 and 2018 in stock buybacks and dividends. Still, in the decade from 2010 to 2019, 65 German companies in the DAX 30 and MDAX 60 indices paid out a total of €338.8 billion, or 46 per cent of their combined profits, in dividends, in addition to €35.3 billion, or 5 per cent of profits, in stock buybacks. more>

China after November

By Basil A. Coronakis – The war between the US and China that started shortly after the election of Donald Trump in 2016 and has since continue at relatively low intensity w

There is no doubt, of course, that it will continue at even stronger pace after the election, regardless of who the winner is, whether it is the remains of the Democratic party or of the Republicans. Indeed, Trump has brought the US’ relations with China to a point of no return. And regardless whether he will or not win a second term, the Sino-American war will not stop.

American society has been intelligently brain-washed by the Trump Administration into holding China responsible for the Wuhan Virus pandemic, and the more lives it costs in the United States, the more Americans will hold China responsible. As this is, for ordinary Americans, a matter of life or death, their anger and hatred for China will continue to grow in parallel with the pandemic effects.

It would be far fetched to speculate that Trump has handled the pandemic in the way to have exactly this effect, but there is no doubt that he maximized it as an excellent detergent for brain-washing the people of Main Street.

Americans are convinced that China is responsible for the pandemic, which is true, but to communicate this sort of truth efficiently, and to engage the entire population of the United States, was a victorious tactical maneuver in the New Cold War against China.

Now all Americans are psychologically engaged against China and this is the bond that the next president will be forced to continue the war against China. If he does not, he will certainly be accused for high treason, an accusation which regardless of what the impact is on his presidency, will carry on in the historical record.

For China, this war is a win-win situation because if Beijing loses, it will be completely isolated from the rest of the world and will have no external influences, which means no dangers, thus leaving the Communist regime with eternal power. For China’s Communists, isolation is the best-case scenario as they will maintain power and extend their totalitarian rule to all aspects of life by eliminating any potential threat to their grip on power, all of which will be done pretty easily as the Chinese people have never sensed freedom or democracy, and they are trained to work for a handful of rice under the shadow of the Great Helmsman. more>

Updates from McKinsey

How to build a data architecture to drive innovation—today and tomorrow
Yesterday’s data architecture can’t meet today’s need for speed, flexibility, and innovation. The key to a successful upgrade—and significant potential rewards—is agility.
By Antonio Castro, Jorge Machado, Matthias Roggendorf, and Henning Soller – Over the past several years, organizations have had to move quickly to deploy new data technologies alongside legacy infrastructure to drive market-driven innovations such as personalized offers, real-time alerts, and predictive maintenance.

However, these technical additions—from data lakes to customer analytics platforms to stream processing—have increased the complexity of data architectures enormously, often significantly hampering an organization’s ongoing ability to deliver new capabilities, maintain existing infrastructures, and ensure the integrity of artificial intelligence (AI) models.

Current market dynamics don’t allow for such slowdowns. Leaders such as Amazon and Google have been making use of technological innovations in AI to upend traditional business models, requiring laggards to reimagine aspects of their own business to keep up. Cloud providers have launched cutting-edge offerings, such as serverless data platforms that can be deployed instantly, enabling adopters to enjoy a faster time to market and greater agility. Analytics users are demanding more seamless tools, such as automated model-deployment platforms, so they can more quickly make use of new models. Many organizations have adopted application programming interfaces (APIs) to expose data from disparate systems to their data lakes and rapidly integrate insights directly into front-end applications. Now, as companies navigate the unprecedented humanitarian crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and prepare for the next normal, the need for flexibility and speed has only amplified.

For companies to build a competitive edge—or even to maintain parity, they will need a new approach to defining, implementing, and integrating their data stacks, leveraging both cloud (beyond infrastructure as a service) and new concepts and components. more>

Related>

Updates from Ciena

How governments can solve layer 3 network complexity
What if government agencies could monitor and analyze their IP networks to ensure peak efficiency and service continuity—all while trying to modernize the network, balance cost, performance, and resiliency? Jim Westdorp, Ciena Government Solutions’ Chief Technologist, explains how this is possible.
By Jim Westdorp – The dynamic nature of IP networking makes it virtually impossible to know at any point in time how traffic is traversing your networks. Troubleshooting problems by issuing pings and router CLI commands, scanning log files, and manually correlating the results is imprecise and inefficient. Many government networks disable services like Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), which makes these inefficient tasks impossible. The results can impact service delivery, the agility of the network, and mission.

Traditional management tools have several limitations. For example, they can’t:

  • Provide real-time visibility into routing paths across the network
  • Provide unique alerts for Layer 3 technologies related to: state changes, pathing, performance, and the availability of the network elements to route packets
  • Show and model how routing errors and changes impact service delivery
  • Understand the resiliency of the network
  • Correlate routing events with performance metrics of network services to assure service performance
  • Compute and provision transport paths to deploy new services
  • Provide unified visibility and analysis for multi-vendor, multi-layer networks

Think about all the things you’d like to be able to do with your network, and ask yourself a few questions:

  • What if you could get a graphical view of all the IP flows in your network and gain deeper insights into traffic patterns, flows, and congestion?
  • What if you could drill deep into specific flows to understand the detailed route and particular pieces of network equipment those flows traversed?
  • What if you could troubleshoot your network using DVR-like functionality to see the exact state of the network at the time of an event, even if it was days in the past?
  • What if you had automated analytics to help identify the best paths to route traffic through your network?
  • What if your cyber team could utilize the same platform to be alerted to conditions indicative of external interference with a government?

Often, “what-ifs” are hypotheticals. Not in this case, with Blue Planet’s Route Optimization and Analysis (ROA).  This technology has been field-proven for more than a decade with government entities that have strategic imperatives to monitor and analyze their IP Networks to ensure peak efficiency and service continuity—all while trying to modernize the network, balance cost, performance, and resiliency. more>

Related>

Updates from Chicago Booth

Ever closer to an optimally cost-efficient assembly-line operation
By Chuck Burke and Vanessa Sumo – Companies such as Dell and BMW use an assemble-to-order production strategy that keeps common components on the factory floor, ready for final assembly into the type of personal computer or vehicle that a customer orders. This is great for companies looking to satisfy a large volume of demand but that don’t want to build whole units in advance, to avoid any unsold products.

However, the difficulty of estimating how much of each component to hold in stock and how to allocate components to each product can keep companies from maximizing ATO’s benefits in practice.

A cross between two alternate production strategies

Make-to-stock strategy: MTS managers forecast consumer demand and match anticipated orders with an inventory of fully assembled products.

Make-to-order strategy: On the other hand, MTO systems wait for a customer’s order to arrive before starting production. Because this can include procuring parts and assembling components, MTO often results in a longer lead time.

Assemble-to-order strategy: An ATO strategy aims to combine the best of both systems—its flexibility lets companies fulfill large orders relatively quickly with minimal unsold inventory, yet still allows customers to partially customize orders. Here is how it works:

Managers must decide the quantity of components to order even before they can ascertain customer demand for their products.

When customers’ orders arrive, managers must then choose how to allocate the supply of components to each product for assembly. more>

Related>